Introduction
Water sustains life.
1 That water is unsubstitutable for human survival is sadly compounded by the fact that the Earth's largest number of poor inhabits in South Asia. Water problems of South Asia come from a welter of complex sources: rising demand for water due mainly to the rising population 2 and the imperatives of development, 3 water -mismanagement‖, 4 uneven distribution, Convention. And, finally, Part V concludes upon suggesting an outline of the cooperation mechanism.
Overview of the Principal Legal Regimes of Water sharing between the SAARC Countries
Three such regimes may be identified: India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, and India and Nepal. Each of these will be discussed briefly.
India and Pakistan
India and Pakistan were part of the British India before 1947 and thus only the British India was responsible for laying the foundations of the watersharing regime between India and Pakistan. The regime comprises of and concerns the six rivers of the Indus basin (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi) which originate in the Himalayas and pass through India and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir before crossing over to Pakistan and part of Jammu and Kashmir controlled by Pakistan.
18 India and Pakistan agreed in 1948 to pay as charges for the re-establishment of water flow. But Pakistan repudiated it in 1951, characterizing it as unfair, and the dispute did not resolve until both the countries signed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960. 19 The IWT was signed to regulate water sharing between the two countries after -the Indian government resisted Pakistan's 1949 proposal to take the Indus waters dispute to the Court.‖ 20 While the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) were assigned to Pakistan, India -retained the right to use these rivers for the purposes of generation of the hydroelectric power. 21 And despite otherwise strained relations between India and Pakistan, the IWT has survived all conflicts between them. 22 The International Law Commission (ILC) has termed the IWT as one of -the prime cases of equitable apportionment or utilization.‖
23

India and Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a least-developed country of South Asia which attained independence from Pakistan in 1971. After a number of short-term agreements 18 -This led to the internationalization of the water dispute and a negotiation process began to agree over the terms for use of water in the Indus basin. ‖ Dar (2011 ‖ Dar ( -2012 , at 2. Further, see Michel (1967) . 19 Haines (2014) at p. 646: Biswas (1992 Haines (2014) at 640. 21 Article III (2) of the IWT; Uprety and Salman (2011) at p. 643. 22 Further, see Gulhati (1973) . 23 The Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Third Report (1982), 146, para. 65. signed between Bangladesh and India since 1972 for sharing the Ganges waters at Farakka, India and Bangladesh signed the Ganges Waters Treaty in 1996 for a period of thirty years. 24 A dispute had emerged between India and Bangladesh as a result of India's construction of the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges in 1975, which had been termed as -the Kashmir of Bangladesh's grievances with India‖.
25
The Treaty aims at sharing the Ganges waters at Farakka, 26 which further lays down that the waters released to Bangladesh will not be reduced below Farakka except for reasonable uses by India. 27 The Treaty establishes a joint committee to record the daily flow of waters at Farakka 28 and to serve as the first mechanism for resolving any difference or dispute between the two countries arising out of implementation of the Treaty. Any such unresolved difference or dispute shall be next referred to the joint-river commission and finally to the governments of the two countries. 29 The Treaty is guided by equity, fairness and no harm to either party.
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India and Nepal
Nepal is a land-locked country and one of the least-developed countries in South Asia. The instant regime consists of three treaties of 1954 , 1959 . The 1954 India-Nepal Agreement (revised in 1996 on the Kosi River Project 31 was for the purposes of flood control, irrigation and generation of hydroelectric power. The Treaty recognizes that the Chief Engineer of the Indian province of Bihar may be authorized by Nepal to conduct investigation and surveys of the Project. The Treaty expressly contemplates the use of water and power by Nepal, royalties, compensation for land, navigation rights, fishing rights, use of Nepali labour, the possibility of arbitration for the settlement of disputes, and of revision in the changed circumstances. Nepal, non-derogation of Nepal's sovereignty and jurisdiction over the land given by Nepal to India for the purposes of the execution of the project 36 and provides for arbitration for the settlement of disputes.
37
The most important here is the 1996 Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal. 38 The Mahakali Treaty incorporates the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization inasmuch as the equal utilization is without prejudice to the existing uses of the parties. 39 The Treaty envisages a Commission that is required in its work to be guided by no harm to either party. 40 Each Party has undertaken not to use or obstruct or divert the waters of the Mahakali River adversely affecting its natural flow and level except by an agreement between the parties. 41 Salman and Uprety hope that -the Mahakali will be developed in an integrated way to maximise the total net benefit from development.‖ 42 However, the functioning of the Treaty hardly allows a conclusion that it has been able to resolve all matters that arise out of it. Some of these will be the subjects of discussion in the next section.
Functioning of the Principal Legal Regimes of Water sharing between the SAARC Countries
The functioning of the principal legal regimes of water sharing in South Asia points to a number of shortcomings. Limitations of the existing water sharing regimes in the South Asian region and their potential to degenerate into conflicts are attributable to a host of factors. Water disputes in the region -can be traced back to the institutions created by the British Raj.‖ 43 The very nature of transboundary movement of water and its common economic importance to the states make water sharing -a forum for relinquishing or asserting exclusive sovereignty‖ 44 and thus potentially -a fulcrum for peace or war‖ in South Asia.
45
One of the major sources of disputes in the IWT comes from hydroelectric power projects. 46 One such dispute was the Baglihar run-of-the-river hydroelectric power projects on the Chenab River in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dar (2011 Dar ( -2012 at 3. 47 Pakistan objected to its design as it considered its coordinates to be too liberal than were required for the project. This was considered as a -difference‖ within the meaning of the IWT which led to the appointment of Raymond Lafitte as a Neutral Expert. The Expert gave it report in 2007.
concerns about use of water as a strategic weapon during war. India on the other hand viewed the dispute as a difference in views on the engineering of hydroelectric plants.‖ 48 The Baglihar Neutral Expert viewed that the principle of integration and the principle of effectiveness should guide the interpretation of the IWT so as to allow for the fulfilment of its object(s) and purpose(s). 49 Later, the Kishenganga Arbitration between India and Pakistan affirmed that the minimum flow is open to reconsideration notwithstanding the principle of res judicata. 50 While the Neutral Expert's findings are of considerable importance in the matters of treaty interpretation, the Kishenganga Arbitration in no small measure essentially underscored the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization in its ruling that requires India to release 100% of the flow of water if it is less than 9 cumec.
51
Besides the problematic issue of power generation projects between India and Pakistan, 52 the IWT has been considered insufficient mainly because of its perceived limitations to answer questions, such as the environmental security and the capacity of the joint working mechanisms, even as the diplomatic efforts continue to prevent these issues from degenerating into disputes or vioelnce.
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Other contentious issues include the diversion of water outside the basin on the western rivers, 54 adverse effects on the stream flow and saline ingress due to excessive groundwater pumping 55 , the challenge of climate change in the Himalayan region, 56 the discharge of water into the sea by the Indus river system and increased salinity with little water flowing into the sea. 57 These issues can be a cause of competing claims and conflicts. 58 Despite the fact that the IWT contemplates future cooperation -experts from both sides agree that building cooperation on a treaty of division is tricky.‖
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Commentators have opined that Bangladesh has been dissatisfied with its share of water under the Treaty. 60 It has been claimed that -the agreement was arrived at on the basis of water availability between 1949 and 1988.‖ 61 Further,
48 Dar (2011 Dar ( -2012 Dar (2011 Dar ( -2012 at 29. 53 Dar (2011 Dar ( -2012 at 2. 54 Ibid. 55 Verghese (1997) . 56 Dar (2011 56 Dar ( -2012 water diversion has resulted in -the destruction of the breeding and raising grounds for a number of Gangetic species, the increase of salinity in the southwest coastal region of Bangladesh and a reduction of fish and agricultural diversity.‖
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Still there is no agreement between the two parties on how -to augment the flow of the Ganges during the dry season and provide sufficient amounts of water for both parties.‖ 63 The Treaty has preferred -political means, not legal, to resolve any dispute [and] the absence of arbitration mechanisms makes this legal instrument less effective than the Mahakali Treaty‖ 64 between India and Nepal. While the 1996 Ganges Waters Treaty between India and Bangladesh -explicitly upholds the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization water supplies, the Treaty does not provide for any mechanism to other riparian countries of the Ganges basin for finding a long-term sustainable solution of the current crisis and for integrated management basin.‖ 65 The no harm principle in the Ganges Treaty has been found to be -slightly different from Article 7 of the Watercourses Convention since the Treaty treats these principles on an equal footing [under which] a lower riparian state in a parched region with fully utilized rivers might claim that any use of the watercourse by an upper riparian state would be harmful to it.‖ 66 Further, it has been noted that -the operation of the Farakka Barrage is not dealt with in the Treaty… [which] is a subject for which dispute settlement is provided implies that Bangladesh has a say in its operation since it is there that India must release the waters of the Ganges in the prescribed quantities to Bangladesh.‖ 67 And -[u] nlike the Mahakali Treaty concluded by India with Nepal, the Ganges Treaty makes no provision for judicial settlement of disputes‖.
68
Thus, the Ganges and Brahmaputra have water-sharing agreements but they do not involve all the states within the basin areas. Bangladesh points out that the Ganges -provides drinking water to the people, sustains agriculture, forestry and fishery, serves as the main means of transport, keeps back the saline water from the Bay of Bengal and plays a dominant part in the ecology of the region.‖ 69 Further, India's diversion of water has been held responsible for dry season conditions for Bangladesh. 70 India points out that it has no alternative source of water to flush the Hooghly and preserve Calcutta port whereas -Bangladesh is served by alternative river systems and actually has a problem 62 Gain and Giupponi (2014) at p. 2501. 63 Uprety and Salman (2011) at p. 651. 64 Uprety and Salman (2011) 70 For an examination of input-output controls, social input prices, bilateral water trade, a water market for all water users, and a fixed water allocation agreement, as possible water policies, for cross border river water sharing, see Giannias and Lekakis (1997) at p. 232. of surplus water, most of which flows unused down to the sea‖. 71 It has been argued that -shifts in the discharge of the Ganges waters may occur due to both natural climatic variability and to human abstraction. India claimed that this was due to low winter and summer rainfall in northern India, while Bangladesh argued that the low flow was the result of only water diversions upstream of Farakka.‖ 72 It is unfortunate that -Bangladesh and India were not able to form a consensus to maintain a regular flow downstream […] because the technopolitical debate between Bangladesh and India on the impact of the Farakka Dam is based on general observation and anecdotal evidence instead of quantitative assessment of water requirements.‖ 73 A more prominent dispute between India and Bangladesh concerns the sharing of the Teesta River water. 74 An ad hoc agreement made in 1983, was never put into practice. 75 In 2004, making a major shift from its 1983 stance, Bangladesh proposed that -10% of the Teesta waters be kept for natural flow, 39% for India, 36% for Bangladesh and the rest be distributed proportionately. However, India insisted that the scientific studies be first completed.‖ 76 It is widely believed that domestic politics in India is one of the problems in the resolution of this dispute which is also due to the lack of exclusive competence of the Indian central government to resolve it.
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The 1954 India-Nepal Kosi Project Agreement has been termed as -inappropriate‖ as -the barrage-building was based on knowledge of an engineering fraternity prevailing on the non-silting rivers of Europe and North America‖. 78 And the 1959 Gandak Treaty between India and Nepal has been considered as -a bad deal for Nepal, because it had the effect of curtailing Nepal's right to Gandaki water for use inside Nepalese territory‖. 79 Nepal still wants to further revise Article 9 of this Treaty that limits Nepal's right to use its water inside Nepal only. A dispute called, the Kalapani dispute between India and Nepal, came in the limelight in 1997 when the Mahakali Treaty came up for ratification by Nepal and could not be resolved despite several efforts. 80 Thus, the experience of the India-Nepal Mahakali River Treaty of 1996 has been less than all positive as it also created a trust-deficit between the two countries due further to -the construction of a Dam at Pancheshwar, displacement of Nepali people for a purpose which will benefit India, and non-assurance of a fair price to Nepal for the electricity that the latter will export to India. Perhaps the only common element that emerges from the functioning of these regimes is that regular institutional mechanisms have remained less than optimized, not to speak of the Indian announcement of suspension of such talks under the IWT in 2016. Clearly, a -[f]ragmented governance contradicts the advice of hydrologists, environmentalists, and engineers who argue that the optimal and sustainable approach to manage an international river is to treat it as an integral unit that respects the ecological interdependence within the ecosystem.‖ 86 While the -increase in demand continues to be a catalyst for conflict,‖ 87 -unilateral behaviour of India‖ 88 and the difficulty in disentangling water disputes from other bilateral problems add to and aggravate the problems shown by a fragmented legal regime of water sharing in South Asia.
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Salient features of the Watercourses Convention
State practice and juristic work prior to the coming into existence of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1997 (the Watercourses Convention), show at least four principles of international river water-sharing. Of these, the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty principle allows a state to use the waters of a river in its territorial limits without any regard for harm it causes to other riparian states. Opposed to this is the Absolute Territorial Integrity Principle which allows the lower riparian state to require the upper riparian state to allow for the natural flow of an international river. The Third is the Equitable and Reasonable Utilization principle which combines the earlier two principles and is the most acceptable principle today. 84 Further, see Gourdji (2005) ; Upreti (2005) . 85 Uprety and Salman (2011) at p. 656; Sultana (2004) . 86 Zawahri and McLaughlin Mitchell (2011) at p. 836; Mirza (2004) . 87 Uprety and Salman (2011) at p. 643. 88 Adhikari (2014) at pp. 45, 56. 89 Shah and Giordano (2013) at p. 30. Further, see Frederick (1996) . 90 Further, for instance, see above, Section III, discussion on the legal regime between India and Bangladesh. Lipper (1967) . 91 Further, see generally Earle et al. (2010); Caponera (2007) ; Giordano and Wolf (2002) ; Wouters (2011); McCaffrey (2007) .
The Convention is a product of the ILC, which started working on it as early as 1971. On 21 May 1997, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Watercourses Convention and invited countries to become parties to it. 92 Of the SAARC member countries, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal were its sponsors. Maldives was in its favour. India and Pakistan abstained. Afghanistan and Sri Lanka were absent. It came into force on 17 August 2014, with 34 parties.
93 But insofar as it reflects customary international law, it is binding on non-parties.
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The Convention defines a watercourse as a single unit of surface and underground waters that includes the main river, its tributaries and distributaries, and any connected lakes, wetlands, and aquifers. The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization contained in the Convention is widely viewed as a codification of customary international law.
95 A non-exhaustive list of factors and circumstances which states are required to consider for the purposes of equitable and reasonable utilization and participation is given in Article 6.
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Under the obligation not to cause significant harm, 97 a riparian state, which believes that it has sustained significant harm due to the activities of a co-riparian state, may take up the matter with the co-riparian state which is required to reach an equitable and reasonable solution. This principle is also widely viewed as a codification of customary international law. Another principle contained in the Convention is the principle of prior notification of planned measures by which a state, in which a planned activity may have a significant adverse effect upon another state or states sharing an international watercourse, is required to provide timely notification of the plans to the other states. Consultations and negotiations are required to be undertaken with a view to reaching an equitable resolution if the notified states believe that the planned measures would be inconsistent with the Convention. 93 Further, see Salman (2015) . 94 Further, see McCaffrey and Sinjela (1998); Helal (2007) ; Tanzi and Arcari (2001) . Further, see generally, Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (2002) . 95 Article 5. This principle is also contained in the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, UN GA Res. 63/124, dated 15 January 2009.See also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/ Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997, 7, para. 85. 96 Article 5 of the Law of Transboundary Aquifers: Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization: 1. Utilization of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system in an equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of article 4 requires taking into account all relevant factors, including: (a) The population dependent on the aquifer or aquifer system in each aquifer State; (b) The social, economic and other needs, present and future, of the aquifer States concerned; (c) The natural characteristics of the aquifer or aquifer system; (d) The contribution to the formation and recharge of the aquifer or aquifer system; (e) The existing and potential utilization of the aquifer or aquifer system; (f) The actual and potential effects of the utilization of the aquifer or aquifer system in one aquifer State on other aquifer States concerned; (g) The availability of alternatives to a particular existing and planned utilization of the aquifer or aquifer system; (h) The development, protection and conservation of the aquifer or aquifer system and the costs of measures to be taken to that effect; (i) The role of the aquifer or aquifer system in the related ecosystem. Commentators believe that the Convention subordinates the obligation not to cause significant harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
99
The reasons for the reluctance of states to ratify or accede to the Convention -considerable ambiguity as to which of the two principles prevails.‖ 100 However, one of the basic obligations under the Convention is the obligation to cooperate.
101
The Convention does not necessarily require abrogation of the existing arrangements but allows future arrangements in accordance with the equitable and reasonable utilization principle.
102 The Convention's approach underscores the considerations of genuine human needs and protection against pollution.
103 Its implementation mechanism, like the Helsinki Rules, 104 is flexible and not rigid to allow for a balancing of interests.
Conclusions
Uprety and Salman, 105 while advocating built-in flexibility, adaptive allocation, redefining availability, choosing an adequate method in transboundary water-sharing and a vision for cooperative development, underscore that the Watercourses Convention is -the only international -framework law‖ applicable to transboundary waters‖ 106 and discount -a formal conclusion as to why the South Asian countries are uncomfortable with the Convention.‖ 107 This is not to ignore the differing national positions on the Convention. 108 However, even when South Asian countries have opposed the Convention they have used its principles or reasoning for defending their positons. For instance, according to India, the -[a]ssertion of a right to -natural flow‖ amounts to exercising a veto on the rights of upper riparians to reasonable and equitable shares of the waters of common rivers. 109 As noted above, the 2007 Decision by the Neutral Expert on 99 See for instance Bourne (1997) . 100 Salman (2007) Uprety and Salman (2011) at p. 657. 106 Uprety and Salman (2011) at pp. 659-60; Rojas and Iza (2007); Iyer (2007) . 107 Uprety (2014) . Further, see generally Iza and Stein (eds.) (2009). 108 For example, Pakistan is against -groundwater‖ being part of the watercourse definition of a -watercourse‖, also because it is inequitable to include aquifers that are located entirely within the territory of one country. India considers that the Convention in Article 3 contradicts its domestic law whereby water is constitutionally a state rather than a Union matter. It also believes that the term -sustainable‖ is ill defined in Articles 3 and 5 in the context of sustainable utilization. Moreover, all SAARC countries give different interpretation to the word -significant‖ in the context of -no significant harm‖ in Article 7. And all of them do not accept Article 32 on equality of access to transboundary remedies which is taken as presupposing regional integration. Bangladesh prefers the concept of international river basin to that of international watercourse. Further, see the Replies of the Governments to the Commission's Questionnaire, General comments of Bangladesh, Yearbook of ILC 1982, vol. II(i) Lipper (1967) . 110 Further, see Villiger (1997) at p. 17; Mendelson (1998) ; Kelley (2000) ; ILC, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 68th session (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016) UN Doc. A/71/10. 111 For instance, the water can be stored in upstream Nepal for release during the dry season to increase the river's flow and dilute its pollution. Zawahri and McLaughlin Mitchell (2011) at p. 836; World Bank (2010) ; Fitzmaurice (1998) . 112 Further, see Uprety and Salman (2011); Magsig (2009) ; UN-Water (2008) at p. 7; Sadoff and D Grey (2005) ; Bhaduri and Barbier (2003) at p. 47; Uprety (2012); Rahaman (2009) ; Wouters et al (2005) ; Hooper and Lloyd (2011); Price (2013) at p. 36; Iyer (2007) . 113 See, for instance, Pratap (2015) . Further, see Jägerskog and Zeitoun (2009) . 114 Jadhav Case (2017). Kamruzzaman et al. (2012) ; Dore et al. (eds.) (2010); Tanzi (2010) . 115 As evidenced by the IWT, the India-Nepal Kosi Project Treaty (1954), the India-Nepal Gandak Treaty (1959) SAARC was founded no earlier than 1985 and after formulation of their above objections to certain formulation of the Watercourses Convention. Cooperation as an international obligation is sufficient to require cooperation of the SAARC countries, such as on the lines of SAARC Regional Centres, for providing a necessary institutional support for the implementation of equity, reasonableness, flexibility, and adaptation in the South Asian water sharing. 119 Ready availability of an institutional mechanism is necessary as a means of dispute avoidance in the context of the obligation of states to settle their disputes by peaceful means and as a corollary to the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations.
